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I. DO INSTITUTIONS MATTER FOR 
DEVELOPMENT?
“Corruption hurts the poor disproportionately-
-by diverting funds intended for development, 
undermining a government’s ability to provide 
basic services, feeding inequality and injustice, and 
discouraging foreign investment and aid.”
Kofi Annan, conference for the United Nations 
Convention against Corruption in 2003
1. It’s politics, stupid
In 1992, Bill Clinton used a powerful 
motto for his presidential campaign, in oppo-
sition to his rival George H. W. Bush. It’s 
the economy, stupid, turned out to be a catchy 
political phrase used to remind voters of the 
importance of bringing more attention from 
the government to the economy of the Uni-
ted States. Paraphrasing this motto, the title 
of this section aims to draw attention to the 
perspective of many economists who argue 
that focusing on the economy alone does not 
necessarily ensure sustained development. 
Politics do matter for development. And espe-
cially corruption, an issue inherently involved 
in politics all over the world.
In the quest for economic development, 
political scientists, development economists 
and politicians of all kinds and levels have 
focused on the conditions that will ensure the 
take-off of the economies all over the world, 
guaranteeing better living conditions for the 
population of every nation. Theories that 
describe the need for a certain level of human 
resources, capital flows, infrastructure or finan-
cial stability as a requirement for development 
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1 For instance, the discussions maintained in the studies by Goodman (1974) and Huntington (1968), or the 
studies of Rose- Ackerman (1978) or Johnston (1983), Goodman (1974), Johnston (1983) or Coolidge & 
Rose-Ackerman (1995).
have shared the stage with those that consider 
that ‘getting the politics right’ is a prerequisite 
for development. As Hyden & Court (2002) 
pointed out, the issue of the quality of political 
institutions has been taken into account for 
most of the late development economists.
These authors present an analysis of the 
evolution of development strategies in the 
world since the establishment of the Marshall 
Plan, showing how the issue of politics has 
received growing attention. Development 
thought, they argue, evolved from strategies 
focused on the development of projects, in 
the early 1950s to what they call development 
“by the people” since the mid 1990s. This shift 
in development strategies, boosted by the po-
licies promoted by international organizations 
and civil society, presents a focus on the role of 
citizenry to promote sustainable development, 
requiring higher levels of transparency, anti-
corruption measures and accountability from 
their governments. (Hyden & Court, 2002).
At the same time, several schools of eco-
nomic thought have devoted part of their stu-
dies to analyze the effect of political institutions 
and corruption in development. Sound insti-
tutions that build efficient strategies to avoid 
the proliferation of corrupt practices have been 
advocated for since the early days of economic 
and political theory. Their roots can be found 
back in time, for example in the work of Max 
Weber and his view on the role of the State 
(Nee, 2003). As Cypher and Dietz (2004) 
discussed, new institutionalists in economics 
such as Gunnar Myrdal or Douglas North 
have argued the importance of the role of the 
State institutions in the promotion of develo-
pment. (Cypher & Dietz, 2004: 176).
A focus on corruption and the political en-
vironment of development has also been taken 
into account by, for example, the neoliberal 
economists. The ideas sustained by authors like 
Lord Bauer, Deepak Lal, Anne Krueger, 
Tullock or Bhagwati presented critiques to 
the extension of state intervention with argu-
ments based on its harming effects deriving 
in crowding out of private investment, or the 
creation of opportunities for rent-seeking acti-
vities and corruption. Less involvement of the 
state would imply less space available for the 
flourishing of corrupt practices (Deonandan, 
2006; Cypher & Dietz, 2004). 
It is noticeable that throughout the last 
decades of economic development thinking, 
the analysis of the role of politics in the develo-
pment strategies has been gaining importance. 
(Heller, 2008) However, after the 1990s, 
this issue has received a particular boost. In the 
words of Deonadan (2006) “As the geopolitical 
rationale for supporting dictators waned, and 
globalization, democratization, privatization 
and stabilization became the objectives of the 
new millennium, the rise of official corruption 
has become the new enemy of western economic 
security. It is a major threat because it puts in 
jeopardy the successful realization of these new 
goals” (Deonandan, 2006: 2). Even when 
discussions from several decades ago1 show an 
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early interest in the issue, there is still a lack 
of consensus on the methodological appro-
ach of this analysis and the debates in social 
sciences around it are still alive and producing 
numerous academic initiatives, in empirical 
as well as in theoretical research (Dreher & 
Herzfeld, 2005).
2. Corruption in the center of the debate
a. Defining and measuring corruption
Usually understood as the misuse of en-
trusted power for private gain, the first defi-
nitions of corruption responded to a focus on 
the work of government officials. In this sense, 
Huntington (1968), in a definition used by 
Goodman (1974) presented corruption as the 
“behavior of public officials which deviates from 
accepted norms in order to serve private ends” 
(Goodman, 1974: 144). Rose-Ackerman 
(1978) debated the same question, and com-
pared the definition of corruption with the 
concept of rent-seeking activities used by Krue-
ger (1974) or Bagwhati (1974) (Coolidge 
& Rose-Ackerman, 1995). Shleifer and 
Vishny (1993) also focused on the so-called 
public corruption, when arguing that corrup-
tion was understood as “the sale by government 
officials of government property for personal 
gain” (Shleifer & Vishny, 1993: 599). The 
main focus on corruption perpetrated by 
public officials has been maintained in time 
and similar approaches can be found in Tanzi 
(1998), Mauro (1995), Aidt (2009), Aidt 
(2003) or Treisman (2000), Treisman (2007) 
to point some of the recent studies.
Despite these minor differences in the de-
finition of corruption, the main disagreements 
appear when debating on the methodologies 
to measure it. As Kauffman et al (2006) 
present it: “Since corruption is clandestine, it 
is virtually impossible to come up with precise 
objective measures of it” (Kaufmann, Kraay, 
& Mastruzzi, 2006: 3). 
Measurements available are the result of 
institutional efforts to elaborate proxies that 
attempt to capture corruption practices in the 
most accurate way possible. Two broad catego-
ries of measurement can be pointed out in the 
process of development of proxy-indicators of 
corruption: Perception-based indicators and ex-
perience-based indicators. The perception-based 
indicators are composite indexes that aggregate 
the perceptions of different stakeholders related 
to corruption levels, whereas the experience-
based indicators are built based in polls made 
to citizens asking their actual experience in 
dealing with corruption. The two most widely-
known perception-based indicators are the 
Corruption Perceptions Index (cpi) develo-
ped by Transparency International and the 
Worldwide Governance Indicators (wgi) built 
by the World Bank Institute (wbi). Both me-
thodologies focus their efforts in trying to cap-
ture third-party perceptions on the issue and 
aggregating them in the construction of dif- 
ferent indexes. By aggregating different sources 
the results are expected to become a good proxy 
of the corruption phenomenon in reality2.
2 To develop these indexes, both institutions gather information from several sources, including international risk 
rating agencies, academics, business people, surveys and consultants on the topic, giving different weight to each one 
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The main criticisms done to these two 
indicators relate both to the weight given to 
the sources when aggregating them, as well as 
to the type of sources used. Critics point also 
to the use of the external-sources in the first 
place: “Aggregate indicators are also susceptible 
to misuse due to their selection bias (favoring ex-
pert over population surveys), poor methodology 
and scoring criteria, transparency, lack of reliable 
comparisons over time or across countries (if the 
component sources differ from year-to-year or 
between units of analysis), and the likelihood of 
correlation errors in sources (i.e., the influence of 
other expert assessments, political/financial crisis 
and country economic performance, as well as 
respondent errors on perception data)” (undp 
& Global Integrity, 2008: 21).
Despite the rather strong criticism di-
rected at these main two measurements, em-
pirical research relies mainly in both of the 
rankings mentioned. As Kauffman (2007) 
and Lambsdorff (2007) point out, there is 
hardly any other source that provides syste-
matically measurement of corruption. The 
lack of other alternatives remains as one of 
the strongest rationales to continue with 
their use. Besides, both authors (being the 
main responsible for the construction of the 
indexes for both institutions) claim to use as 
many controls as possible to maintain the ob-
jectivity of the indicators at the highest levels 
(Lambsdorff, 2007; Kaufmann, Kraay, & 
Mastruzzi, 2007). Several empirical stu-
dies defend the quality of these indicators by 
performing correlation analysis between the 
different indicators constructed. The sustai-
ned trends of correlation among the different 
indexes, as well as the high correlation with 
also experience-based indicators are arguably a 
sign that they should serve as a good proxy of 
what the corruption phenomenon is in reality, 
as most of the different perceptions coincide. 
(Treisman, 2007; Weber Abramo, 2000).
b. Economic effects of corruption 
The analysis of corruption trends and its 
effects on countries’ economic performance 
have been catching the attention of scholars 
in every corner of the world. The availability 
of the corruption measurements that started in 
the early nineties caused a significant increase 
of empirical research in the field. In general 
terms, very few empirical conclusions have 
reached a high level of acceptance, across indi-
cators, studies and regions of the world.
Perhaps the most widely accepted con-
clusion is derived from the debate on the 
possibilities of corrupt practices to become 
a tool to fasten growth. The “Greasing the 
growth wheels” hypothesis, presented in the 
mid 60s by some authors like Huntington 
(1968) or Leff (1964) who pointed that co-
rruption was an effective method to avoid rigid 
bureaucracies and raise the pace of economic 
development, gained substantial opposition 
at theoretical, ethical and empirical levels. It is 
clear that even though corrupt practices might 
of them. In this sense, the type and number of sources used for each country differs for both of these main indicators 
(Heller, 2008).
 0Rev Opera 10_final 2012.indb   44 4/18/12   2:51 PM
45
OP E R A ,  N o  1 0
produce some efficiency gain in the micro-
level (for instance, paying bribes to speed up 
long, bureaucratic procedures) they at least 
distort resource allocation, in the macro level 
(Aidt, 2009: 19). As seen in Table 1, most of 
the empirical research done in the area shows 
that high corruption levels relate to poor 
macroeconomic results. However, the way 
and extent that corruption affects economic 
performance remains still unclear, and several 
studies come to different conclusions across 
different regions and time-frames. 
c. Links between poverty and corruption
The debate on whether corruption has 
direct effects on poverty rates has led to two 
kinds of model of analysis: the economic mo-
del and the governance model. The first model 
focuses on the effects of corruption on ham-
Table 1. Findings From The lasT decades oF empirical research
EffEcts 
on
Economic links of corruption - kind of study Authors
In
te
rn
at
io
n
al
 T
ra
d
e
Exporters from less corrupt countries face disadvantages 
in import countries with a high corruption level. Corrup-
tion harms level of FDI.
Cross country panel 
analysis.
(Habib and Zurawicki 
2002) (Wei 1998)
Openness of the economy, as measured by economic 
freedom, has a positive relation with corruption levels.
Cross-country panel 
analysis.
(Shen and Williamson 
2005)
Higher levels of Regional integration are associated with 
lower levels of corruption.
Cross-country panel 
analysis.
(Sandholtz and Gray 
2003)
lo
ca
l e
co
n
o
m
ie
s
Decentralization processes obtain poor results with high 
levels of corruption. 
Cross country panel 
analysis.
(Freille, Haque and Kne-
ller 2007)
In the municipal level, corrupt governments obtain worse 
financing conditions.
Panel Study in the US. (Butler 2004)
Unofficial economy mitigates government-induced 
distortions because of corruption and as a result, leads to 
enhanced economic activities in the official sector. 
Cross-Country dynamic 
model of general equi-
librium.
(Choi and Thum 2002)
In
co
m
e 
In
eq
u
al
it
y 
an
d
 
p
o
ve
rt
y
Corruption positively correlates to higher income inequa-
lity and poverty. 
Cross-Country dynamic 
model of general equi-
librium.
(Blackburn and For-
gues-Puccio 2007)
Corruption increases income inequality and poverty by: 
reducing economic growth, increasing the progressivity 
of the tax system, distorting the level and effectiveness of 
social spending.
Cross country panel 
analysis.
(Gupta, Davoodi, & 
Alonso-Terme, 1998)
Income inequality increases the level of corruption.
Cross-country panel 
analysis.
(You und Khagram 
2005)
Continúa
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pering economic growth, which in turn affects 
poverty rates. In this line, the effects analyzed 
in Table 2 can derive in an increase of poverty 
levels. 
The governance model focuses on the 
impacts of governance factors, which in turn 
affect poor people. In this case, focus is set, 
for example, on the study of the increase in 
poverty due to poor performance of the govern 
ment in the collection of taxes and revenues 
or on the loss and misallocation of resources 
due to corrupt public officers (Chetwynd, 
Chetwynd, & Spector, 2003).
The channels through which corrupt 
practices hamper economic performance 
and prevent poverty reduction strategies are 
varied in their nature, and have been studied 
with different perspectives. The World Bank 
Institute (2002) produced a study showing 
possible links wherein higher corruption levels 
could be associated with higher poverty levels, 
summarized in Table 2.
Many empirical studies have tried to 
provide evidence from the links between 
poverty and corruption trends around the 
world. Surprisingly, few of these initiatives 
have been focused in the regional trends of 
Latin America, a region where both, high co-
rruption levels and high poverty rates, coexist 
presenting enduring challenges for the regio-
nal governments.
II. BUILDING A MODEL ThAT LINkS 
POVERTy AND CORRUPTION 
1. A common challenge: Poverty and Income 
Inequality in Latin America
In the last decade, as shown in Graph 1, 
Latin American economies have shown rela-
EffEcts 
on
Economic links of corruption - kind of study Authors
Ec
o
n
o
m
ic
 p
er
fo
rm
an
ce
No effects of corruption levels on GDP growth rate - 
Strong inverse relation with genuine wealth per capita.
Cross-country panel 
analysis.
(Aidt, 2009)
Corruption has no significant effect on economic growth 
in democracies, while non-democracies suffer significant 
economic harm from corruption practices. 
Cross-country panel 
analysis.
(Drury, Krieckhaus and 
Lusztig 2006)
An increase of corruption reduces GDP growth and GDP 
per capita. 
Cross-country panel 
analysis.
(Dreher & Herzfeld, 
2005) (Meon and Sekkat 
2005) (Mauro, 1995)
Lower perceived corruption correlates closely with higher 
economic development.
Cross-country panel 
analysis.
(Treisman, 2000)
High corruption levels are associated with: Higher public 
investment but lower productivity of these investments, 
lower government revenues, lower expenditures on 
operations and maintenance and lower quality of public 
infrastructure.
Cross-country panel 
analysis.
(Tanzi & Davoodi, 1997)
Source: author’s own elaboration based on the papers quoted. (2009).
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tively strong gdp growth. Relative to global 
economic trends, especially when considering 
the period following 2002, Latin American 
gdp growth was significantly higher than the 
oecd and world averages, and this phenome-
non has been relatively homogeneous in the 
whole region. 
Table 2. synThesis nexus beTween corrupTion and poverTy
Im
m
ed
ia
te
/P
ro
xi
m
at
e 
ca
u
se
 o
f p
o
ve
rt
y
corruption cAusEs: duE to:
Lower Growth
Unsound economic/institutional policies due to vested interests
Distorted allocation of public expenditures
Low human capital accumulation
Absence of Rule of Law and property rights
Governance obstacles to Private sector development
Capture by elite firms reduces overall enterprise sector growth.
Poor gets smaller 
share in growth
‘Capture’ by elite of government policies and resource allocation
Regressivity of Bribery ‘Tax’ on small entrepreneurs and the poor
Regressivity in public expenditures and investments
Unequal income distribution
Smaller firms are disproportionally affected by corruption/bribery
Impaired access 
to public services
Bribery impairs access and quality of basic services for health, education, justice–particularly 
to the poor
Capture by elites of access to quality public services
Health/Education
Corruption affects human capital accumulation (incl. infant mortality, literacy, as per above, 
with disproportional impact on the poor)
Source: Kaufmann, Transparency, Incentives and Prevention (tip) for Corruption Control and Good Governance Empirical Findings, Practical Lessons, 
and Strategies for Action based on International Experience, 2002, p. 7.
graph 1. gdp growTh raTes 1998-2008
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However, the recent and positive econo-
mic trends are insufficient to address the cha-
llenges in terms of poverty and inequality that 
previous strategies of development have left in 
the region. According to data provided by the 
eclac, by the end of 2007, 184 million people 
were living in poverty, out of which 67 million 
lived in indigence. Even when the poverty rates 
in the region show a sustained decline since 
2003, the absolute number of citizens under 
the poverty line is still higher than 1980 and 
the percentage rates show a poor improvement, 
going from 40.5% in 1980 reduced to 34.6% 
in 2007 (eclac, 2008). The average poverty 
figures in the region are alarmingly high, as 
is seen in Graph 2, and are accompanied by 
steadily high income inequalities measures. 
Latin America exhibits the highest inco-
me inequality rates in the whole world. With 
a Gini coefficient of 0.53 in 2007 with a range 
of 0.43 and 0.57 the region shows a worse in-
come distribution pattern than other develo-
ping regions in the world (eclac, 2009: 26). 
The social exclusion, the levels of violence and 
deprivation linked to the high rates of poverty 
coexisting in Latin America, a region that at 
the same time shows extremely high levels of 
wealth and high development standards, are 
a key element of the development agenda of 
the region. Whether these apparently irrecon-
cilable sides of economic growth are correlated 
with the high levels of corruption exhibited 
as well in the Latin American governments, 
is what the empirical analysis of this article is 
trying to address.
2. Developing an empirical model to analyze 
the links of poverty and corruption
For the empirical analyses in this section, 
the main corruption measurements used come 
from two of the institutions presented before. 
Despite the disagreements discussed in the 
first section on the difficulty to establish valid 
graph 2. poverTy  and income inequaliTy  in la 1998- 2008 /daTa by  sedlac
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Source: (sEdlAc, 2009) (unu-widEr, 2008), author’s own calculations (2009).
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corruption measurements, the work of Trans-
parency International (ti), and the World 
Bank Institute (wbi) has become the main 
source for the empirical research done in the 
area in the last years and it has been used for 
this study as well. Both the results from the 
Corruption Perceptions Index (cpi) and some 
of the indicators that comprise the Worldwide 
Governance Indicators (wgi) have been used. 
In combination with these two main indexes, 
the Global Corruption Barometer (gcb), a 
worldwide population survey conducted by 
ti between 2004 and 2008, and a series of 
indicators aiming to measure both develop-
ment and poverty trends in Latin America 
have been used3. 
The analysis focuses on 18 Latin Ameri-
can4 countries that exclude mainly Caribbean 
countries, due to lack of sufficient data. The 
information of the dataset has been obtained 
from each one of the original sources, as well as 
from the Quality of Government Dataset, pre-
pared by the Quality of Government Institute 
from the University of Gothenburg in Sweden 
(Teorell, Charron, Sammani, Holmberg, 
& Rothstein, 2009). For space reasons, the 
complete regression tables and the detail of the 
variables is not included but can be provided 
upon request.
3. Running the empirical analysis for Latin 
American countries
a. Links between corruption measures: the 
case of Latin America
As a first step to perform a statistical 
analysis on the links between poverty and 
corruption trends in Latin America, it is 
important to focus on the existence of links 
between the different types of corruption mea-
surements. As pointed out in the first section, 
the correlations between perception-based 
and experience-based corruption indicators 
are not strong enough to consider the use of 
perception-based parameters alone. There are 
in fact, very few alternatives to the perception 
measurements of corruption. One of these al-
ternatives is the gcb, which is included in this 
study. Even when the gcb is not a complete 
measurement of the whole range of corruption 
in a country, it gives a concrete panorama of 
how the average citizen is affected by corrup-
tion in their daily life. 
In the case of Latin America, there is 
a strong correlation among all the different 
perception-based indicators, from both sour-
ces: the wbi and ti, as shown in Graph 3 dis-
3 Please note that many variables that account for the same kind of measurements have been included (e.g. several 
different indicators for the measurement of poverty) as none of the databases available were complete. There are gaps 
in all the different measurements, however, the database prepared by the sedlac is the most complete of all. The use 
of the log form of some variables has been included as an attempt to capture more completely the nature of the rela-
tion between variables, following similar empirical research in the area as the models presented by Daniel Treisman, 
Claudio Weber Abramo or Evan Osborne (Treisman, 2000; Treisman, 2007; Osborne, 2004; Weber Abramo, 
2000).
4 The countries studied include: Argentina, Dominican Republic, Nicaragua, Bolivia, Ecuador, Panama, Brazil, El 
Salvador, Paraguay, Chile, Guatemala, Peru, Colombia, Honduras, Uruguay, Costa Rica, Mexico and Venezuela
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played above. When comparing the findings 
among the different variables, indicated in 
the graph by points, the correlation among 
them becomes clear. In fact, the correlation 
coefficients of these variables range between 
78% and 94%, for all the different variables 
used in the period 1998-2008. This presents 
a high correlation level, in line with the results 
presented by Treisman or Weber Abramo, 
discussed in section I (Treisman, 2007; We-
ber Abramo, 2000).
However, if we include the ti gcb, based 
on actual experiences of citizens with corrup-
tion, in the analysis of differen corruption 
measurements, the correlations are not as 
strong. As seen in Graph 3, there is a higher 
dispersion when comparing the gcb with the 
rest of the indicators, than among the rest of 
them. In fact, as Table 5 shows, the correlation 
coefficients are notably lower for the period 
available (2004-2008). The coefficients ob-
tained when running the correlations range 
from -29% to -42% for each one of the varia-
bles showing that the trends of the rest of the 
world, discussed before can be seen for this 
region as well, but to a lesser extent. 
Just to point out some examples, in 2008 
10% of the Chilean respondents reported 
having paid a bribe–a proportion close to 
the mean of the region for that year, 14.8%. 
However, Chile’s score in the cpi was 6.9, the 
highest score in the region, far from the LA 
graph 3. scaTTer ploT regressions oF all diFFerenT corrupTion measuremenT variables
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mean of 3.56. In the same year, only 4% of 
the Argentinean respondents reported having 
paid a bribe, but the cpi score of the country 
– systematically one of the lowest in the 1998-
2008 decade–was only 2.9. The case of Costa 
Rica, for instance, was paradigmatic in 2004: 
14% of the population reported paying bribes 
in the gcb, but the country achieved one of 
the highest cpi scores of the region: 4.9, higher 
than the average of 3.47 obtained in the same 
year for the region. 
b. Evolution of the corruption indicators in 
the region
When analyzing the evolution of corrup-
tion trends in Latin America, it can be obser-
ved that all the different wgi indicators follow 
a similar path. The performance of each one 
of them shown in Graph 5 makes visible that 
the indicator with the worst performance is 
consistently the Rule of Law (rl), with values 
that range between -.34 and -.52. 
It is noticeable that this indicator has a 
worsening path throughout the years, where 
the rest of the indicators show a somewhat low 
but improving performance since 2005.The 
fact that in the perceptions of the experts the 
rl has been worsening in the region especia-
lly after 2002, might reflect the rise of some 
leftist governments in the last years in a clear 
opposition to the neoliberal agenda that ruled 
the governments in the 90s.
As Salas points out in his 2009 study, the 
rise of leftist governments all over Latin Ame-
rica presents big challenges for the implemen-
tation of a political agenda that has historically 
been associated with the role of political oppo-
sition, rather than being the ones in charge of 
the State (Tinker Salas, 2009: 149). Some 
of the political reforms proposed by this new 
wave of governments in the region aimed at 
increasing the focus on social issues, have cau-
graph 4. comparing Ti  corrupTion measuremenTs
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sed increased suspicion from the international 
business arena that might have affected their 
perceptions, and therefore the construction of 
the RL indicator. 
Taking into consideration that this in-
dicator assesses the level of contract enforce-
ment, among other issues, it is not surprising 
that the decisions of some Latin American 
governments to re-nationalize companies, ex-
propriating them from their private owners, 
might have affected the overall performance 
of this indicator for the region. This might be 
the case of the oil and gas nationalizations in 
Bolivia, the pension schemes and the airlines 
in Argentina, or the cement industries in Ve-
nezuela, for example5.
The evolution of the cpi from ti also 
presents a gloomy panorama: the cpi perfor-
mance, exhibits a relatively constant average 
score for the region, with a small range of 
variation that reached a maximum peak of 
3.92 in the year 2000 and a minimum peak 
of 3.37 in 1998. The 2008 average of the CPI 
in the region was 3.56, a score that has been 
growing at a slow pace since 2006. However, 
performances at the country level are not as 
homogeneous as other indicators. As shown 
in Table 3, the results within the region vary 
graph 5. evoluTion oF corrupTion indicaTors in la 1998-2008
.2
0
-.2
-.4
-.6
1998 2000 2002
Year
2004 2006 2008
WB - Control of Corruption WB - Voice and Accountability TI - Global Corruption Barometer
WB - Government Effectiveness WB - Rule of Law
Source: author’s own calculations (2009).
5 In this sense, the performance of Argentina or Venezuela results paradigmatic. Argentina in 1998 with Carlos 
Menem in power-following a right-wing neoliberal agenda- scored +0.08 in the Rule of Law indicator. Since then, its 
performance has been decreasing especially after 2002, reaching a score of -0,61 in 2008, with Cristina Fernandez in 
office that sustains a leftist discourse. Venezuela in the same period, with Hugo Chávez leading a leftist presidency, has 
seen its performance in the RL indicator fall from -0.71 to -1.59, placing the country in the 2.9% lowest positions of 
the world ranking. 
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widely. The countries that have had the worst 
performance on average in the last decade 
have been Paraguay, Ecuador, Honduras and 
Venezuela, with averages below 2.5. On the 
opposite side, the best performers in the re-
gion during the period 1998-2008 have been 
Chile, Uruguay and Costa Rica, with average 
scores over 4.5. 
Table 3. average cpi  scores 1998-2008
Country CPI Score Country CPI score
Chile 7.218
Dominican 
Republic
3.075
Uruguay 5.650 Argentina 2.930
Costa Rica 4.791 Guatemala 2.730
El Salvador 3.873 Nicaragua 2.660
Peru 3.873 Bolivia 2.527
Brazil 3.800 Venezuela 2.373
Colombia 3.518 Honduras 2.370
Mexico 3.491 Ecuador 2.300
Panama 3.375 Paraguay 2.022
Source: author’s own calculations (2009) based in (Transparency 
International, 2009).
c. Results of the regressions between 
indicators: corruption and development in 
Latin America
As a last stage of the empirical analysis, 
regression models have been conducted to 
uncover the possible links between corruption 
indicators and poverty and development indi-
cators in the region. The construction of the 
models has followed similar patterns to those 
developed by empirical research already done 
in the topic, in line with the type of analy-
sis proposed by (Alesina & Weder, 2002; 
Gupta, Davoodi, & Alonso-Terme, 1998; 
Mauro, 1995; Morris, 2004; Osborne, 
2004; Treisman, 2000 or Tanzi & Davoodi, 
1997). In this sense, in this study, linear regres-
sion models have been developed in different 
stages, using the variables described. 
b.1 Developing the Econometric model of 
analysis
In the first stage, a model with the varia-
bles measuring corruption has been regressed 
against the poverty and development indica-
tors without further restrictions (Model (a)). 
However, while all Latin American countries 
share many cultural and political traditions, 
many differences in the development perfor-
mances can be found within the region at a 
country level. For this reason, a second model 
has been developed, with the inclusion of fixed 
effects by countries, as performances in the co-
rruption area are influenced by many national 
institutions and particular trajectories of each 
country in the region (Model (b)). Finally, as 
some of the variables included in the analysis 
are prone to change subject to macroeconomic 
shocks, a fixed effect by year was established 
in the third model of regression, a panel re-
gression, where year fixed-effects were added 
to the country fixed effects (Model (c)). It is 
also important to point out that the different 
regressions have been tested to provide robust 
results, in terms of heteroskedasticity and serial 
correlation. 
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As a first approach, the models with fur-
ther restrictions might provide results more ro-
bust or conclusive when analyzing their impli-
cations, but at the same time, the restrictions 
might impede to follow the behavior of the 
variables in a wider geographical scope, or in 
a trend sustained in time, considering the ex-
planatory power of each one of the regressions 
analyzed. When considering the R-Squared of 
the regressions performed, it is noticeable that 
the outcomes in terms of R-squared values for 
each one of the regressions are not high. Espe-
cially when considering the most and the least 
unrestricted models, the R-Squared doesn’t 
present a high explanatory power in any of 
the regressions. While it is important to point 
out that these results imply that the variation 
on the development and poverty indicators 
cannot be explained by the corruption indi-
cators alone, it is also important to focus on 
the objective of this particular study. 
The main aim of this study is not to ex-
plain the evolution of the poverty and develop-
ment indicators in the region, but to analyze 
whether a link can be established between co-
rruption and poverty. More than focusing on 
the development of an in-depth analysis of the 
direction and extent of these links in each one 
of the countries, this research studies the re-
sults in a more general perspective, identifying 
the overall trends in the region. Furthermore, 
the levels of R-squared obtained from these 
regressions are not substantially different from 
the results obtained in other empirical studies, 
as the ones pointed out in section 1. Therefore, 
the results will be analyzed for the different 
models of regression, but it is important to 
take into account the drawbacks of using the 
different results. 
In the following sections, the results for 
each one of the independent variables will be 
discussed, grouped in two main categories. In 
the first part, the results of those independent 
variables that directly measure corruption will 
be presented. In this sense, the results of the 
indicators from Transparency International 
(ti-cpi and ti-gcb) and the ones from the 
World Bank Institute (wgi-Control of Co-
rruption) will be analyzed in their interaction 
with development and poverty indicators. In 
the second part, the second group of indicators 
that measure the conditions that may affect the 
development of corruption in a more indirect 
way will be presented, that is the Worldwide 
Governance Indicator of Voice and Accounta-
bility (wgi-va) and the Rule of Law (wgi-rl). 
As stated before, most of the tables are not 
being included in this publication for space 
reasons, but can be provided upon request.
b.2 General remarks
As general remarks of the results obtained 
from the regression models, it is striking to 
point out the fact that none of the corruption 
indicators yielded significant results when re-
gressed against the growth rates of the region, 
in none of the models. 
These results compared to the ones of 
the emblematic study of Mauro in 1995, 
show that the relation is not clearly sustained 
in the same terms in Latin America (Mauro, 
1995). One of the causes might be that the 
author used different indicators to measure 
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for corruption and government effectiveness 
in his 70-country cross national study, when 
he affirmed: The negative association between 
corruption and investment, as well as growth, is 
significant in both a statistical and an economic 
sense (Mauro, 1995: 705). Another point is 
that the growth rates in the region, for the pe-
riod included in this research, may also reflect 
the fact that the countries in the region -which 
are exporters of commodities- have benefited 
from the rising prices in the international 
market, and therefore growth rates are not in 
line with corruption performances, that have 
not experienced any significant change in their 
trends in the last decade. Another surprising 
result is that none of the regressions showed 
a relation among Corruption Indicators and 
Inequality measures, even when Latin America 
is known for being the most unequal region in 
the world (eclac, 2008: 19).
However, the results are different if the 
case of the gdp per capita is analyzed. In gene-
ral terms, the findings for the region are quite 
similar to those presented by Treisman in his 
two studies of 2000 and 2007 where he stated 
that the gdp per capita was highly correlated 
with the corruption measurements of ti and 
the wgi. Even when the results reported for 
this sample show a lower level of correlation 
(ranging from 0.48 to 0.65), the existence of 
a relationship among these indicators in the 
same line as the results presented by Treisman 
can be confirmed for Latin America (Treis-
man, 2007; Treisman, 2000). 
4. What are the effects of corruption on 
poverty and development indicators?6
a. Direct corruption measurements and 
poverty in the region
Using the main direct corruption mea-
sures –wgi-cc, ti-cpi and ti-gcb– some links 
with poverty and development can be uncov-
ered in the region. When the wgi indicator 
of Control of Corruption is regressed against 
all the development and poverty indicators, 
several significant relations appear in the first 
model. The measurements done by the wbi 
show that an improvement in the scores of the 
wgi- cc will yield in a reduction in all poverty 
measurements, for a 99% level of significance. 
At the same time the model describes a posi-
tive relation with the Human Development 
Index (hdi) and the gdp per capita measu-
res. However, when controlling by country 
and year, the significant relations are reduced 
to only three, all of them related to poverty 
measurement. This is also confirmed by the 
data shown in Table 4 that presents a strong 
correlation of the two most complete poverty 
measurements available, with the wgi-cc. 
6 Please note that the sources for each one of the variables used in the regressions presented in these sections are de-
tailed below, in Appendix A. The different models used and their levels of restriction, as detailed in section 2.c will be 
indicated in every table with the heading Model, referring to: (a) Model without restrictions, (b) Model with Country 
fixed effects and (c) Model with country and year fixed effects.
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Table 4. correlaTion beTween wgi-cc and 
poverTy  measures
WB - 
Control of 
Corruption
povErty linE 
- 2.5 u$s 
pEr dAy
povErty linE 
- 4 u$s pEr 
dAy
Poverty line - 
2.5 U$S per day
-0.6995 1
Poverty line - 4 
U$S per day
-0.7360 0.9879 1
n=105–Source: author’s own calculations (2009) based in (World Bank 
Institute, 2009) (sEdlAc, 2009).
Using the main direct-indicator from 
Transparency International, (ti-cpi, percep-
tion based) the direction of the relations found 
between the ti-cpi and the different poverty 
and development indicators show similar re-
sults than those obtained when the wgi-cc 
was used, shown above. In fact, to confirm this 
trend, the correlations obtained between the 
poverty measures and the ti-cpi shown in Ta-
ble 5 are highly similar to those of the wgi-cc.
Table 5. correlaTion beTween Ti-cpi  and 
poverTy  measuremenTs 
TI- Corruption 
Perceptions Index
Log Poverty line-4 U$S per day -0.6857  
Poverty line–2.5U$S per day -0.6358
Poverty line-4 U$S per day -0.6452
n=124 - Source: author’s own calculations (2009) based in (sEdlAc, 
2009) (Transparency International, 2009).
When analyzing the regression coefficient 
of the ti-cpi, it is important to note that the 
wgi-cc indicator consistently presents higher 
values for each one of the relations regressed. 
Furthermore, the R-Squared values reported 
for the wgi-cc are higher as well, showing that 
the wgi-cc has a better explanatory power 
than the ti-cpi for these relations. Given the 
similarity in the construction of these two in-
dicators, and the sources used, differences can 
be attributed to different weighing strategies 
used to add different sources of information 
when building the indexes. The regression that 
better captures the poverty measurements and 
the ti-cpi are the variables in their log forms, 
an indicator that the relation among both 
variables is not as linear as the one with the 
wgi- cc. 
Once again, the results obtained show a 
strong link between the corruption indicator 
and the poverty measurements. However, it is 
important to note that the higher coefficients 
related to poverty were obtained relating it 
to the moderate measurements of poverty (4 
US$ per day and National Poverty-eclac). As 
it can be seen in the model (a) from Table 6, 
the coefficients are higher for both National 
poverty line of eclac and the 4 US$ poverty 
line used by the sedlac. These results suggest 
that higher corruption in the region is asso-
ciated with a worsening of economic condi-
tions, but not to the citizens that are already 
in extreme situations. In this sense, it can be 
argued that this is a sign that the social policies 
implemented by Latin American governments 
to alleviate poverty are distorted due to corrupt 
practices, but they still reach those citizens 
in worse conditions. In this case, if policies 
mainly reach indigents, instead of the whole 
poor population, the coefficients linking co-
rruption measurements with poverty would 
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be smaller for extreme poverty measures, as it 
is in fact shown in Table 8. 
Even when the mechanisms through 
which corruption affects economic perfor-
mance are not uncovered by these regressions7, 
nor the causality of the relation among them8 
it is clear that these results show a link between 
corruption and poverty trends for la. This 
empirical evidence goes in line with the idea 
that a country showing better anti corruption 
mechanisms can achieve a more efficient dis-
tribution of resources, yielding in better outco-
mes in terms of poverty alleviation. 
It is striking to point out, however, that 
the results obtained when using the only 
experience-based indicators available (the TI 
Table 6. regressions wiTh Ti  -corrupTion percepTions index
Model (a) (b) (c)
VARIABLES
Human 
Develop-
ment 
Index
GDP per 
capita
Poverty 
line - 2.5 
U$S per 
day 
Extreme 
Poverty 
- ECLAC
Na-
tional 
Poverty 
- ECLAC
Poverty 
line - 4 
U$S per 
day 
log 
Poverty 
line - 2.5 
U$S per 
day 
log 
Poverty 
line - 4 
U$S per 
day 
GDP per 
capita
log GDP 
per 
capita
log 
Poverty 
line - 2.5 
U$S per 
day 
log 
Poverty 
line - 4 
U$S per 
day 
log 
Poverty 
line - 4 
U$S per 
day 
TI - Corrup-
tion Percep-
tion Index
0.0256*** 544.7*** -6.060*** -4.544*** -7.878*** -7.433*** -0.323*** -0.216*** 544.7*** 0.261*** -0.323*** -0.216*** 0.0851*
(0.00568) (105.2) (1.100) (1.111) (1.772) (1.298) (0.0610) (0.0404) (105.2) (0.0541) (0.0301) (0.0207) (0.0464)
Constant 0.680*** 501.2 46.77*** 30.50*** 69.42*** 68.22*** 4.245*** 4.434*** 501.2 6.676*** 4.245*** 4.434*** 3.391***
(0.0286) (625.2) (4.418) (4.700) (6.794) (5.098) (0.195) (0.133) (625.2) (0.283) (0.109) (0.0760) (0.165)
Year fixed 
effects
No No No No No No No No No No Yes Yes Yes
Country 
fixed effects
No No No No No No No No No No No No Yes
Observa-
tions
168 168 125 76 76 124 125 124 168 168 125 124 124
R-squared 0.289 0.242 0.399 0.409 0.396 0.432 0.484 0.470 0.242 0.300 0.484 0.470 0.655
             18
Robust standard errors in parentheses-*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Source: author’s own calculations (2009) based in (Transparency International, 2009) (UNDP - HDR, 2009) (ECLAC, 2009) (UNSTATS, 2009) (UNU - 
WIDER, 2008) (SEDLAC, 2009).
7 For a detailed discussion on the ways in which corruption can affect poverty and development indicators, please 
refer to section 1. 
8 For a discussion on the causality of the relations between poverty and development indicators and corruption 
indicators please refer to section 4.
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– Global Corruption barometer) the results 
obtained are erratic. Very few regressions have 
resulted in significant outcomes when running 
all the models, showing that the models are 
not robust, mainly due to the few observa-
tions available to build the comparisons that 
are not enough to allow to draw long-term 
conclusions. In order to obtain better results 
when analyzing experience-based measures 
of corruption with poverty and corruption 
in la, a longer period of measurement should 
be allowed.
b. Non- direct indicators of corruption: 
Government measures against corruption 
and its impact on Poverty and Development
In this last section, the relation among 
the indicators that intervene in the control of 
corruption in an indirect way, measured by 
the wgi indicators of Voice and Accountability 
(wgi-va) and Rule of Law (wgi-rl) will be pre-
sented. In general terms, the link between po-
verty and development indicators is maintai-
ned. It can be argued upon these results, that 
a better institutional setting, given by a better 
performance in the wgi indicators, would 
indicate a better outcome of the develop- 
ment and poverty indicators, even when the 
results are not completely consistent through 
the different models, as it will be discussed 
below. When using the country and year re-
strictions, the regressions present an inverse 
relation to those that would be expected from 
the theoretical analysis of the Governance Mo-
del of Analysis. 
As discussed in the first section, there is 
a wide recognition among scholars that go-
vernance indicators matter when it comes to 
obtain sustainable and fair outcomes from de-
velopment strategies, and that these outcomes 
require effective approaches to tackle corrup-
tion. Authors such as Court, Hyden, & Mea-
se (2002), eclac (2002, Kaufmann, Kraay, & 
Mastruzzi (2009), Korzeniewicz & Smith 
(2000) or Teichman (2004) use different ar-
guments that refer to the importance of high 
levels of governance in the establishment of 
national development strategies. 
When performing the empirical analy-
sis of this study, the trends pointed by many 
scholars regarding the relation between high 
governance levels and development outcomes 
are consistent with the results of the first mo-
del of regression, not including country or year 
restrictions. However, when restricting the 
analysis to Models (b) and (c), the coefficients 
obtained show a direction of the relationship 
opposed to the literature in the field. As shown 
in Table 7, Model (b) and (c) predict an in-
verse relation between the hdi levels and the 
wgi-rl score, and a direct relation between 
the National Poverty measured by eclac and 
the wgi-rl score. The reduction of poverty 
and at the same time a poorer performance 
in the wgi-rl score might be a result of the 
current left-wing governments established in 
the region that consistently decrease the per-
formance in the wgi–rl score, even when the 
poverty indicators (or the hdi which presents 
a similar pattern) present a better outcome. 
This might as well be a result of the increase 
in the commodities prices that has provided 
these same governments with higher resources 
to tackle poverty, without any improvement 
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in the Rule of Law of the nation. In another 
direction, the poor performance in the wgi-rl 
can also be linked to the political actions taken 
by la governments to obtain new mechanisms 
to become reelected, that is weakening the 
validity of National Constitutions that have 
undergone suspicious reform processes in the 
last years, in several countries of the region. To 
improve the results of these regression models, 
variables to control the kind of government 
and/or the commodities prices should be in-
cluded, providing an analysis that goes beyond 
the scope of this study.
Similar patterns can be observed when 
regressing the WGI-Voice and Accountabili-
ty Indicator (wgi-va) against the poverty and 
development indicators. Here, the relations 
that are kept significant throughout all the res-
triction models, are the ones related to poverty 
measurements, including the different varia-
bles used for this analysis. In general terms, 
this implies that a better performance of the 
governments in terms of increasing their ac-
Table 7. regressions wiTh wgi - rule oF law
Model (a) (b) (c)
VARIABLES
Human 
Develop-
ment 
Index
GDP per 
capita
Poverty 
line - 2.5 
U$S per 
day 
Extreme 
Poverty 
- ECLAC
Na-
tional 
Poverty 
- ECLAC
Poverty 
line - 4 
U$S per 
day 
log 
Poverty 
line - 2.5 
U$S per 
day 
log 
Poverty 
line - 4 
U$S per 
day 
log GDP 
per 
capita
Human 
Develo-
pment 
Index
Na-
tional 
Poverty 
- ECLAC
Human 
Develo-
pment 
Index
Na-
tional 
Poverty 
- ECLAC
WB - Rule 
of Law
0.0573*** 1403*** -13.51*** -9.415*** -16.49*** -17.50*** -0.753*** -0.522*** 0.624*** -0.0613** 23.53** -0.0613*** 23.53***
(0.0128) (211.4) (1.951) (2.050) (3.912) (2.660) (0.147) (0.102) (0.0700) (0.0239) (8.301) (0.0135) (4.977)
Constant 0.797*** 3023*** 19.10*** 10.63*** 33.79*** 33.93*** 2.760*** 3.434*** 7.864*** 0.925*** -8.733 0.745*** 52.70***
(0.00818) (265.2) (1.499) (1.400) (2.588) (2.031) (0.116) (0.0801) (0.0528) (0.0279) (9.635) (0.00645) (2.391)
Country 
fixed 
effects
No No No No No No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed 
effects
No No No No No No No No No No No Yes Yes
Observa-
tions
144 144 107 62 64 106 107 106 144 144 64 144 64
R-squared 0.317 0.335 0.496 0.440 0.460 0.570 0.607 0.618 0.358 0.904 0.956 0.415 0.548
Number of 
id2
           18 16
Robust standard errors in parentheses - *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Source: author’s own calculations (2009) based in (World Bank Institute, 2009) (UNDP - HDR, 2009) (ECLAC, 2009) (UNSTATS, 2009) (unu - widEr, 2008) 
(sEdlAc, 2009)..
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countability and at the same time allowing the 
citizens to participate in the development of 
public policies, might result in better poverty 
and development outcomes. 
This implies, as discussed before, that 
better participatory mechanisms, shown by 
a better outcome of the indicator, increase 
the possibility of the governments to be ac-
countable to citizenry. Better accountability 
mechanisms and participatory channels for 
the citizens to get involved in the decision-
making processes of their governments can 
ensure better outcomes from the measures 
implemented to alleviate poverty, as the regres-
sion coefficients of Table 8 show. This in turn 
might lead to a better allocation of resources, 
via two main roads: as less money is plausible 
to be devoted to corruption acts because of the 
higher levels of accountability obtained by the 
governments, more resources can be devoted 
to fighting poverty and promoting human 
development, and/or because the augmented 
citizen participation provides first-hand opin-
ions to establish the central challenges to be 
addressed by governments in their search for 
development. In this sense, the results for the 
region are in line with the idea of a development 
‘by the people’ strategy discussed previously.
III. CORRUPTION AND POVERTy: 
CONCLUDING REMARkS
Coming to an end with the analysis of 
the topic of this study, it is helpful to present 
a recap of the main empirical findings, as 
compared with the theoretical research pre-
sented in the first section. In the first place, 
it is important to remark once more, that the 
empirical results for the regression models in 
the region do not show a significant associa-
tion of corruption with gdp growth rates or 
income inequality measures.
In the case of the gdp growth rates, the 
results are in line with the empirical research 
studies done by aidt (2009) or drury, kriec-
khaus, & lusztig (2006). However, in the 
case of Latin America, the results of these 
regressions might respond to a favorable eco-
nomic context in the whole world for the 
last decade, more than a constant trend in 
the anticorruption and development policies 
adopted by the national governments of the 
region. The increasing prices of the commo-
dities have benefited greatly the economic 
growth rates of the Latin American countries, 
given the fact that these economies still rely 
mainly on the export of agricultural products, 
oil or semi-manufactured goods whose prices 
and demand have been rising in the last years. 
This result can also be linked with the fact 
that the correlation patterns of corruption 
measurement and the level of gdp per capita 
have been established for the Latin American 
data. In this sense, whether the results in terms 
of gdp growth rates and gdp per capita are or 
not in line with the literature in the area still 
lacks from a conclusive definition.
However, the results in terms of income 
inequality remain as one of the most puzzling 
empirical results. The Gini coefficient variable 
did not yield in any significant result when 
regressed against any of the corruption mea-
sures used. This might be a sign, as You & 
Khagram, (2005) point out, that the higher 
income inequality levels are a cause, rather 
than a consequence of the high corruption le-
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vels. In that sense, further research in the area, 
using different specifications of the regressions 
or different measures of income inequality, 
might shed more light on an issue that has 
been affecting the development standards of 
Latin America for the last decades.
Finally, and in line with the focus of 
this study, it is important to note that links 
between different poverty measurements and 
corruption indicators can be found for Latin 
America. Almost every model of regression 
conducted in this research, with different spe-
cifications, as well as with direct and indirect 
measures of corruption presented a significant 
negative relation between poverty and corrup-
tion levels. In some cases, as discussed in the 
previous section, the effects found were stron-
ger, and clearer than in other cases. The exten-
sion of the wgi–Voice and accountability in-
dicator is a clear example, showing the strong- 
est effects in the relation between corruption 
and poverty levels in the region.
It is necessary to point out, as a main 
reminder that the empirical results of the re-
search conducted in this study, do not prove a 
causal directionality between the links presen-
ted between poverty and corruption. In this 
sense, the debate whether it is corruption that 
hinders economic development and therefore 
increases poverty and inequality levels, or 
whether higher poverty and inequality levels 
impede economic growth by fostering corrupt 
practices, remains unsolved. Further clarifi-
cations in this debate would require new and 
improved sources of information for both po-
verty and corruption levels in Latin America. 
However, as it is clear that the directionality 
debate is not solved, it is also clear that both, 
corruption and poverty levels are still main 
challenges for the region. The next section 
intends to suggest the establishment of a stra-
tegy that might tackle with both problems at 
the same time: a strategy developed upon the 
empowerment of citizens. 
Development strategies in the 21st cen-
tury should include citizen empowerment to 
ensure sustainability over electoral periods, 
and at the same time reduce corruption and 
poverty. The extent of technological advan-
cement has already enabled participatory 
mechanisms that were unthinkable a couple 
of decades ago. States have now at the reach 
of their hands, instruments that might enable 
citizens to become more involved in the poli-
cy-making processes. Democracy is not solely 
a matter only of electoral results.
Especially in the fight to alleviate poverty, 
the involvement of the citizens in the policy 
making of development strategies can become 
a useful tool, and at the same time, become 
an instrument that ensures the reduction of 
corrupt practices. Citizens monitoring the 
actions taken by the state become the strongest 
pillars in the fight against corruption, estab-
lishing a constant watchdog mechanism that 
prevents the flourishing of corruption.
At the same time, the development of 
strategies to alleviate poverty that allow partici-
patory mechanisms for the citizenry, increase 
both the sense of ownership in the government 
and the sustainability of its actions through a 
period that goes beyond the electoral mandate, 
leading to a better allocation of resources. Citi-
zens effectively involved in the policy making 
processes of the state, might ensure a continui-
ty of the policies, thus overcoming the usual 
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political rivalries that many Latin American 
countries expeience, as well as allowing for 
the beneficiaries to define their own policies. 
When the voices of those who are affected are 
taken into account, policies present stronger 
and more direct effects. 
Latin America should therefore, engage 
in the promotion of a development strategy 
that ensures sustainable and equitable growth 
for every member of the society, every citizen. 
In this sense, only a strategy that is built from 
their perspective can successfully address the 
pending challenges in terms of poverty, in-
equality and corruption trends. 
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